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Abstract
This paper proposes an analysis of two major tax events which occurred in
the European Union in 2001, the move of Germany from imputation to
exemption and the objective announced by the EU Commission to provide
EU businesses with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide
activities. In particular we examine as to whether those tax systems are able
to become perfectly integrated tax systems by which we mean neutral tax
systems with respect to financial, organisational and locational decisions of a
multijurisdictional firm.
 JEL Classification: H32, H73, H87.
Keywords: corporate taxation, tax competition, European Union.
Marcel Gérard
Arpege/Fucam
Chaussée de Binche 151
B-7000 Mons
Belgium
gerard@fucam.ac.be 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Two major tax events occurred in the European Union in 2001. Since January
Germany - after Ireland and, de facto, UK in 1999 - has moved from the impu-
tation to the exemption system1 and in October the EU Commission released
a report on company taxation which announced the Commission objective to
provide EU businesses with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide
activities2.
Those two events resort to the same trend. The shift in the German tax
system especially seems to end a period and to generate among scientists and
philosophers of taxation a sort of ”burn what you adored”, while the EU sug-
gested new direction goes a step ahead in that trend.
When, in the seventies, economists started to cope seriously with the taxa-
tion of companies - see the seminal works of King (1974) and Stiglitz (1973) -
the vision of the company was clearly the one of an entity operating in a sin-
gle jurisdiction and owned by shareholders who were individuals and residents
of that jurisdiction. Economists were interested in analysing the tax systems
from the viewpoint of their eﬀects on corporate decisions regarding the size of
investments, their ﬁnancing, the dividend policy or the decision whether or not
to incorporate a business. According to King (1977), more than 80 per cent
of US ﬁrms owners at the end of the sixties, were individuals, as opposed to
institutions. Corresponding ﬁgures for the UK were 47 percent. However,
even then, those ﬁgures were progressively declining.
The focus of economists and tax designers was clearly then on the integration
of the tax basis of the ﬁrm and of the individual shareholder, especially to ensure
that progressivity was not altered by ﬂat levies at corporate levels, that no - or
not too much - incentive existed to prevent proﬁt from shareholder taxation or
that corporate and unincorporated proﬁts were taxed in the same way. All that
had to be related to the vision of what was - or still is - an equitable tax system,
av i s i o nm u c hi n ﬂuenced by authors like Haig (1921) and Simons (1938) : they
viewed an equitable system as a system where every taxpayer is taxed according
to his or her ability-to-pay measured by his or her global income, independently
of the type, source and use of the components of that income. In a framework
where factors were interjurisdictionally immobile, that view is not incompatible
with Ramsey (1927) eﬃciency.
In that prospect, the imputation, or crediting, system - where a fraction of
the corporate tax paid by the company on proﬁts intended to be distributed
as dividends, is regarded as an advance payment on the tax liabilities of the
shareholder - seemed to be especially desirable.
Typical of that period is the proposal of European tax harmonization issued
by the EC Commission and reported by King (1977), pp. 57 and 58, that the EU
”harmonization proposals are concerned solely with the taxation of distributed
proﬁts, and consist of two recommendations. The ﬁr s ti st h a th a r m o n i z a t i o n
1On the German tax reform, see a.o. Fuest and Huber (2000, 2001), Homburg (2000),
Keen (2001) and Schreiber (2000).
2See COM(2001) 582 ﬁnal.
1should be under the imputation system with the basic rate of corporation lying
within the range 45-55 %. (...) The second of the EEC Commission’s proposals
is that ’the tax credit shall be neither lower than 45 % nor higher than 55 %
of the amount of corporation tax at the normal rate on a sum representing the
distributed dividend increased by such tax”’.
Around a quarter of a century later Fuest and Huber (2001) conclude a
paper entitled ”Is corporate-personal tax integration in open economies counter-
productive ?” with the statement that ”in an open economy, where the marginal
shareholder is a foreigner, it is not desirable to oﬀer double taxation relief for
dividends paid by domestic ﬁrms to domestic shareholders”.
That move illustrates quite well that we are now in another world, where
capital is mobile and local companies are often subsidiaries of multinational
enterprises.
It parallels the 2001 German tax reform. For a long time, that country
has been a champion of imputation, with a full and repayable crediting system
exhibiting at least two remarkable properties : neutrality with respect to the
ﬁrm decision regarding the choice between equity and debt ﬁnance, on the one
hand, equitable treatment of the share- and bondholders on the other hand,
by which is meant that every share- or bondholder was taxed on ﬁrm’s proﬁt
distributed under the form of dividend or interest at his or her own personal
tax rate, thus in line with the ability-to-pay principle of an equitable taxation.
However, as already pointed out by Boadway and Bruce (1992), and by
Devereux and Freeman (1995) too, those elegant properties are usually not
permitted to cross the borders ; imputation of foreign tax is usually limited to
the high of domestic tax liabilities3 so that the imputation system discriminates
between residents and non-residents stockholders, which is especially hard to
accept in today European Union.
If equity with respect to foreign shareholders cannot be an issue of special
interest for the government of a given country, the non-respect of the ﬁnancial
neutrality property is however subject to consequences. Moreover new forms
of tax neutrality gain sense in an international or interjurisdictional setting,
like the neutrality with respect to the decision whether or not to incorporate a
foreign aﬃliate entity4, and with respect to the location of the parent entity or
of the foreign aﬃliate.
The concept of integration can be reinterpreted in that new context, shifted
from the relation between a domestic company and its individual shareholders
to the link between the members of a given multijurisdictional set of interrelated
companies or branches, including so called controlled foreign companies or CFC.
3The reason for that limitation is obvious. If there were no such limitation, the foreign
government would have the possibility to export the burden of its tax revenue by highly taxing
non residents without causing them any damage in terms of net income.
4When a foreign aﬃliate is incorporated, it becomes a subsidiary and has its own legal
personality ; otherwise it is termed a branch, a foreign entity operated under the legal umbrella
of the abroad parent. Among the branches, tax law usually makes a distinction between
permanent establishments like a plant or a store, and non permanent establishments, like a
representation or a hall of exhibition ; in this paper we suppose that branches are permanent
establishments.
2The legal veil to be broken, between a ﬁrm and its stockholders, has changed
but, in that change, has found out a new relevance. Said otherwise, individual
shareholders are no longer within the integration perimeter of a company but
that perimeter seems to have gained in eﬀectivity.
The recent European Commission communication - EU Commission (2001) -
goes a step forward in that direction when it proposes to organise a consolidated
tax base for related entities operated on the territory of the European Union.
Therefore the joint analysis of the German move and the EU Commission Report
could be presented under the title : from one to another integration.
Thereafter section 2 of the paper suggests the concept of perfectly integrated
tax system, by which is meant a tax system which has no inﬂuence on the
ﬁnancial decisions, the legal organisation and the location of the various entities
of a multijurisdictional ﬁrm. Such a system is thus neutral with respect to the
ﬁnancial choice of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm - between issuing shares, issuing
debt and using retained earnings -, with respect to its legal organisation - the
choice of the legal form of the aﬃliated entities between a subsidiary and a
branch -, with respect to the location of the parent entity - capital import
neutrality - and with respect to the location of the branches or subsidiaries -
capital export neutrality -. Thus it is a system ”as if” the set of jurisdictions
considered made a single jurisdiction. Incidentally note that it is a pre-condition
for an equitable design of the tax system, by which is meant the design of the
system according to distributive rules despite the mobility of the entities.
In section 3 we suppose that the tax base of each entity of a multijuris-
dictional ﬁrm is computed separately and we explore the possibility for a tax
system set up in that framework to become a perfectly integrated one ; we
conduct the analysis for the two most popular forms of interjurisdictional tax
systems, imputation and exemption, examining successively their ability to be
neutral with respect to ﬁnancial decision, legal organisation, capital export and
import, before setting forth the additional conditions necessary for those sys-
tems to become fully integrated. That exercise provides us with the opportunity
to look at the German reform.
In section 4 we conduct a similar exercise assuming that a single tax base
- a consolidated tax base - is computed for the whole multijurisdictional ﬁrm
according to the tax law of the parent entity or of a suprajurisdictional entity.
That exercise allows us to examine the new direction suggested by the recent
EU Commission report on company taxation ; that report indeed suggests the
computation of a consolidated base and its apportionment to the jurisdictions
of the diﬀerent entities, arguing a.o. that such a system can prevent Europe
from some harmful tax competition and transfer pricing issues.
Some conclusions are suggested in section 5.
Before turning to section 2 let us add that, despite the - correct - assertion
of Myles (1995) that ”the study of the eﬀect of taxation upon the corporation
has gradually developed from the initial static analysis of Stiglitz and King
through to fully intertemporal presentation such as Auerbach (1979) and Brad-
ford (1981) (...) Results derived in a static setting can be instructive but are
unable to capture many aspects of the problem”, in this paper intertemporality
3considerations are kept as simple as possible in order to avoid technical diﬃcul-
ties which could distract us from the core issue.
2 A perfectly integrated tax system
Let us assume a multijurisdictional ﬁrm which consists of a parent and two
aﬃliated active entities like plants or stores, either incorporated - then they are
subsidiaries of the parent - or not - then they are branches of the parent -. The
aﬃliated active entities are located in two diﬀerent jurisdictions denoted by i
and j while the parent is located in h, a jurisdiction which can be either i or
j. Without loss of generality the parent can be a company or an individual.
Deemed to live for a long time, the multijurisdictional ﬁrm has invested one
unit of money in production tools which are distributed among the aﬃliates. A
fraction α has been invested in the entity located in jurisdiction i and a fraction
1−α in the entity located in jurisdiction j. Together the two entities produce
one unit of good per period. Entity i produces a fraction α w i t hau n i tc o s to f
production c0 and entity j produces the complement with the same unit cost.
Entity i sells a fraction q of the entire production of the multijurisdictional ﬁrm
on the retail market at unit price v0 < 1 while entity j sells the complement at
the same unit price. A quantity q − α is traded between the two entities at a
transfer price p0,w i t hc0 ≤ p0 ≤ v0. Adopting an intertemporal perspective we




with r a pure discounting rate, and similarly for v and p.
Respective corporate tax rates are τi and τj, invariant over time, and cor-
responding tax shields are ai and aj comprised between 0 and 1 which can be
seen as discounted ﬂows of depreciation allowances. Corresponding parameters
for the parent entity are denoted by a subscript h.
In there is no integration at all the proﬁto ft h ee n t i t yi, for its parent and






[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τd
iaiα (1)
with τd
i the tax rate on distributed proﬁt, if the proﬁt is repatriated as a divi-
dend,
yi2 =( 1− λiτu
i )[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τu
i aiα (2)
if it is as an interest, with τu
i the tax rate on undistributed proﬁt, λ =0
under usual corporate tax rules where interest payment is deductible against
the corporate tax base, and λ =1if cash ﬂo wt a xi sa tw o r k-t h e nai =1 5 -,
yi3 =( 1− τu
i )[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τu
i aiα (3)
5On the cash ﬂow tax see Bradford (1977).






[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τb
iaiα (4)
if it comes from a permanent establishment or a branch, then noting τb
i the
relevant tax rate applied at the branch level. Similar equations can be written
for yjf.
At the level of the parent entity a new taxation at rate τh with a tax shield
ah may occur. A ﬁrst and extreme situation is characterised by a full second
taxation at that level implying a ﬁnal net income
yhf = yif + yjf − τhf (v − c)+τhah (5)
There is then full double taxation.
Moreover it is likely that in such a framework the multijurisdictional ﬁrm
can make proﬁt in manipulating, for tax purposes, the type of ﬁnance, the legal
organisation, the location of the parent, the one of the active aﬃliate entities,
or still the transfer price p. Unlike that, under a perfectly integrated tax system,
the last equation becomes
y =( 1− τ)(v − c)+τa (6)
totally independent of any reference to ﬁnance, organisation or location speciﬁc
parameters. Then, the multijurisdictional ﬁrm has no tax incentive to modify
its ﬁnancing policy, its legal organisation, the location of the plants and the
one of the parent company, or to manipulate the transfer price. This system is
viewed here as a desirable objective, especially since it avoids economic decisions
for tax purposes and puts an end to tax competition. It is termed neutral with
respect to ﬁnance decision, legal organisation, capital export and capital import.
Note that capital export neutrality without capital import neutrality paves the
avenue for tax competition in order to get headquarters or parent entities, while
the converse calls for tax competition to get subsidiaries or branches and to
transfer pricing strategies. Finally full integration is a pre-condition for an
equitable design of the tax system, by which is meant the design of the system
according to distributive rules despite mobility among entities and jurisdictions.
We will now explore under which conditions some particular tax designs are
able to become perfectly integrated tax systems. We do that ﬁrst in a setting
characterised by separate tax bases, then in a framework where the tax base is
consolidated.
3 Separated tax bases
In that setting the tax base is computed per entity as in the equations above.
As shown the combination of that separate computation and separate taxation
can cause full double taxation.
5Most jurisdictions however have set up mechanisms to mitigate that double
taxation ; a typology of those systems is proposed a.o. by Alworth (1988),
Mintz and Tulkens (1996) and completed by Gérard and Gillard (2001). A
ﬁrst way to alleviate the full double taxation is to adopt what Feldstein and
Hartman (1979) term the full taxation after deduction and that we still name
double taxation ; then the last equation becomes,
yhf =( 1− τhf)(yif + yjf) (7)
but most popular instruments to do that are the two mechanisms described be-
low, imputation - also named crediting - and exemption. Both have interesting
properties but neither supports a perfectly integrated tax system except if they
are supplemented by some additional institutional features.
3.1 Imputation
Under an imputation or crediting system a fraction x of the tax paid by the
subsidiary on the proﬁts to be distributed as dividends is regarded as an advance
of further tax liabilities at shareholders level ; the advance, or tax credit, can
also be computed as a fraction x0 of the gross dividend. As a consequence, net

























i [vq − p(q − α) − cα] − τd
iaiα
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[vq − p(q − α) − cα]
+(1− τh1)(1− xh)τd
iaiα (8)
A generalisation of that principle implies that a fraction xλ applies in case
of interest, a fraction xg in case of capital gains - on that latter generalisation,
see Gérard (1982) - and a fraction xb in case of branch proﬁt. Then








































6and similarly for proﬁts from j. However that last equation doesn’t make sense
if the branch and the parent are located in the same jurisdiction.
We can now investigate the properties of the system.
Let us start with ﬁnancial neutrality. To examine that property we only
need to consider the ﬁrst three among the last four equations. Then we can
state that,
Proposition 1 (F-neutrality) The imputation system is neutral with respect
to ﬁnancial choices if (1) the imputation is full, generalised, incentive compatible
and repayable, and (2) the tax rate at parent level doesn’t discriminate among
types of income.




yhf =( 1− τhf)(v − c) (12)
This condition is rarely met by actual systems. Under most of them, when full
imputation is operated xh =1and xλ
h is not necessary since cash ﬂow tax is
actually almost never used6.O t h e r w i s e x
g
h is usually zero.
incentive compatible Incentive compatible means that the parent has to
ﬁnd its own interest using the system. Indeed in most systems a withholding
tax, at best fully creditable on parent own tax liability and repayable if neces-
sary, is levied at source on distributed dividends, at a rate ¯ mi1. The imputation
system is incentive compatible if, omitting the tax shield and assuming the paid










≥ (1 − ¯ mi1)di (13)
That condition is fulﬁlled if adequate exchange of information is at work between
the paying company and the tax administration of the investor or if the existence
of a tax base at parent level is otherwise exactly known by that administration ;
that condition does make problem when the parent is a private person operating
in a framework of anonymous shares and bank secrecy, especially if he or she
is a non resident. Incidentally this explains why a relatively high withholding
tax is a necessary companion of imputation when some bank secrecy exists.
6A notable exception is Italian Irap - see a.o. Alworth and Arachi (2001), Bordignon et
al. (2001) - ; the Italian corporate tax system consists of a dual income tax called Irpeg and
a direct tax on value added called Irap (the rate of that latter tax is smaller but the base
includes interest payments and wage costs).
7repayable That condition implies that the tax administration accepts that
the tax liability of the parent might be negative and then rapays it with the
amount of the excess credit. Such a condition rules out the limitation of the
credit to the high of the parent domestic tax liabilities. If such a limitation
does exist7,











,(1 − ¯ mi1)di
)
(14)
More importantly repayability is never operated at international level8.T h e
reason is straightforward : if applied the government of the distributing entity
would have an incentive to tax outﬂow of income as high as possible since
it can then generate tax revenue the burden of which is entirely supported
by the government of the parent entity. However non-repayability creates a
discrimination between resident and non-resident shareholders, a major reason
which motivated Germany to give up that system (see the example below).
non discrimination among types of income That non discrimination
implies that the tax rate at parent level is independent of the type of income, so
that τhf = τh , f =1 ,2,3. This implies in particular that the capital gains are
taxed like dividends and interest income, when accrued, or that an equivalent
system is operated.
If the conditions are fulﬁlled,
yhf =( 1− τh)[vq − p(q − α) − cα] ,f=1 ,2,3 (15)
independent of the ﬁnancing policy. Then only the tax rate of the parent juris-
diction is relevant and imputation applies the residence principle of interjuris-
dictional taxation. However since repayability never, or almost never, applies
in international ﬁscal relations, it may be that ﬁnancial neutrality is present for
an investment in the entity of the parent jurisdiction, say h = i, but not for
an investment in the other entity, say j. Otherwise non repayability can turn
the imputation system to be either an application of the residence principle
or of the source principle, depending on the relative high of the levies in both
jurisdictions (see the example).
Example 2 (Imputation in Germany before the reform) As an illustra-
tion consider the pre-reform German situation and assume that both the sub-
sidiary and the parent are German, the latter one being either a German com-
pany or an individual resident taxpayer of that country. Given the tax parame-
ters - τd
i = .3165, τu
i = .422, τh = τu
i if the parent is a company and τh = .51
7Belgian reader will note that non refundability explained to some extent why such a
system failed in Belgium.
8See especially Grubert (1998) ; a noticeable exemption seems to be the German-French
tax treaty. An alternative solution noted by Alfons Weichenrieder is to have the tax repaid
by the jurisdiction of the paying entity rather than by the one of the recipient ; such a system,
which looks like an upstream exemption, is actually the one used for withholding taxaes.
Otherwise mechanisms of clearing can also be set up.
8if it is an individual, except for capital gains where it is zero for an individual,
the other tax parameters being zero too -, one has that, assuming no tax shield,
individual company
dividend yh1 =1− τh = .49 yh1 =1− τh = .5780
interest yh2 =1− τh = .49 yh2 =1− τh = .5780
cap. gain yh3 =1− τu
i = .578 yh3 =( 1− τh)(1− τu
i )=.3341
Generalisation of the imputation to capital gains should set equal all the
ﬁgures of the same column.
However that system discriminates between resident and non resident share-
holders. Suppose that two shareholders of a German ﬁrm are subject to a
tax rate τh = .35, however one is a resident taxpayer of Germany while the
other is not. Since the German withholding tax on dividend paid to non
residents is ¯ mi1 = .2638,t h eﬁnal income of the resident shareholder will
be 1 − .35 = .65 w h i l et h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gi n c o m eo ft h en o nr e s i d e n tw i l lb e ,
(1 − .2638)(1 − .3165) = .5032, still assuming no tax shield in Germany ; the
discrimination is due to the fact that, even if the jurisdiction of the non resi-
dent applies the imputation system it will not refund the German withholding
tax together with the German corporate income tax since .2638(1 − .3165) +
.3165 = .4968 >. 35. The system applies the residence principle as long as
the resident shareholder is concerned, the source principle with the other share-
holder.
However the last equation also shows that the tax shields granted to the ﬁrm
are lost when the income reaches the shareholder ; inspection of the equations
reveals that additional tax shield increases the proﬁta tc o r p o r a t el e v e lo nt h e
one hand, but reduces the credit to the shareholder accordingly on the other
hand. This remark is especially meaningful when the active entity and the
parent resort to diﬀerent jurisdictions and it raises the question of the way the
tax shields and incentives cross the borders ; clearly, in the system described
above, an incentive given by the foreign jurisdiction turns out to be a transfer
to the government of the parent jurisdiction. Beyond that is the question of
the transmission of the tax shields from the tax base of the upstream entity to
the one of the parent.
I nl i n ew i t ht h a t ,t h ei n t e r n a lr a t eo fr e t u r ni st h e n(1 − τh)(v0 − c0) and
then the marginal eﬀective tax rate amounts to τh so that there is a tax wedge9.
We can now turn to legal organisation and examine if the imputation system
can be neutral with respect to the decision to incorporate an aﬃliate entity or
to keep it operating as a branch of the parent. Then we could be tempted to
write the proposition without its third condition,
Proposition 3 (LO-neutrality) The imputation system is neutral with re-
spect to the legal organisation of the business if (1) the imputation is full, gener-
alised, incentive compatible and repayable, (2) the tax rate at parent level doesn’t
9The marginal eﬀective tax rate is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the internal rate of
return without and with taxation, divided by the former one ; the tax wedge is the numerator
of that fraction. See King and Fullerton (1984), Gérard (1993).
9discriminate among types of income including proﬁts from branches, and (3) tax
shield in the jurisdiction of the parent is granted independently of the location
of the branch or the subsidiary.
Indeed if conditions (1) and (2) are satisﬁed, apparently
yhf =( 1− τh)(v − c) ,f=1 ,2,3,4 (16)
with of course the same caveats as above regarding the veriﬁcation of the con-
ditions in the real world. However if a branch and the parent are located in
the same jurisdiction imputation is meaningless and, other things being equal,
yh4 =( 1− τh)[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τhahα (17)
if the branch is in h = i while the tax shield is lost if the branch is located
elsewhere.
Then the only way to obtain LO neutrality is to complete the proposition
with the requirement that tax shield in h is granted independently of the location
of the branch or the subsidiary. Then indeed,
yhf =( 1− τh)(v − c)+τhah ,f=1 ,2,3,4 (18)
That additional requirement designs the imputation system in reference to the
full double taxation described above, and imposes a complete re-computation of
the tax base according to the rules prevailing in the jurisdiction of the parent.
This is apparently the way adopted by Japan and the US. Then the marginal
eﬀective tax rate amounts to
τh (1 − ah)
1 − τhah
< τh (19)
so that re-computation of the tax base according to the rules prevailing in the
jurisdiction of the parent turns out to reduce the marginal eﬀective tax rate.
The three conditions stated above also allows us to write that,
Proposition 4 (KX-neutrality) The imputation system is neutral with re-
spect to the location of the branches or subsidiaries if (1) the imputation is full,
generalised, incentive compatible and repayable, (2) the tax rate at parent level
doesn’t discriminate among types of income including proﬁts from branches, and
(3) tax shield in the jurisdiction of the parent is granted independently of the
location of the branch or the subsidiary.
Under those conditions, if tax competition is at work, it is to attract head-
quarters, not active branches or subsidiaries. If governments compete to get
jobs provided by multijurisdictional ﬁrms, the imputation system operated un-
der the mentioned conditions certainly mitigates tax competition. Otherwise
no problem of transfer pricing occurs since yh is independent of p as it is of α
and q.
10Do we now have a candidate for the perfectly integrated tax system,f r e eo f
tax competition ?
The answer is negative. Indeed stopping potential tax competition for
getting headquarters further involves that (τh,a h) be independent of h which
needs a further harmonisation of the tax rates and bases. Such an harmonisation
is also needed if discrimination among parents from diﬀerent jurisdiction of
residence is to be avoided. Then,
Proposition 5 (Perfectly integrated tax system) The imputation system
is a perfectly integrated tax system if (1) the imputation is full, generalised,
incentive compatible and repayable, (2) the tax rate at parent level doesn’t dis-
criminate among types of income including proﬁts from branches, (3) tax shield
in the jurisdiction of the parent is granted independently of the location of the
branch or the subsidiary, and (4) tax parameters in the parent jurisdiction are
independent of the location of the parent.
As a conclusion of this discussion, imputation or crediting is an elegant con-
struction, however the conditions for that system to have the desirable properties
mentioned and discussed so far are hard to satisfy and quasi never met in the
real world, especially the condition of repayability.
3.2 Exemption
The alternative to the imputation is the exemption system. Then income is not
or nearly not taxed either at branch or subsidiary level or at parent level, most
often at that latter level10. Let us note δh the fraction of the income which is
not tax exempt at parent level. Then we have,





[vq − p(q − α) − cα]
+(1− δh1τh1)τd
iaiα (20)
yh2 =( 1 − δh1τh2)(1− λiτu
i )[vq − p(q − α) − cα]
+(1− δh1τh2)τu
i aiα (21)
yh3 =( 1 − δh1τh3)(1− τu
i )[vq − p(q − α) − cα]
+(1− δh1τh3)τd
iaiα (22)
10A notable exception is foreign proﬁts derived through a non permanent establishment.
According to article 7.1 of the model tax convention of the OECD, taxation is only permitted
in the parent entity jurisdiction. Conversely if business abroad is carried through a perma-
nent establishment, the jurisdiction of that establishment is the only one entitled to tax the
corresponding proﬁt.
11and









We can then state and prove the following propositions, starting again with
neutrality with respect to the choice between issuing shares, issuing debts and
using retained earnings.
Proposition 6 (F-neutrality) The exemption system is neutral with respect
to ﬁnancial choices if (1) exemption at parent level is full, (2) the tax system
at subsidiary level doesn’t discriminate between distributed and undistributed
proﬁts, and (3) cash ﬂow tax is at work.
Full exemption at parent level means that δhf =0, f =1 ,2,3 while the
absence of discrimination between distributed and undistributed proﬁts implies
τd
i = τu
i = τi and similarly for j. Further requirement that cash ﬂow tax is at
work implies λ =1and a =1so that,
yif =( 1− τi)[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τiα , f =1 ,2,3 (24)
Such a system is operated according to the source principle11.
Example 7 (Exemption in Germany after the reform) As an illustration
consider the post-reform German situation and assume that both the subsidiary
and the parent are German, the latter one being either a German company or
an individual resident taxpayer of that country. Given the tax parameters -
τi = .2675, δh1 = .05 and τh1 = τh2 = τi if the parent is a company and
δh1 =0 .50 and τh = .51 if it is an individual, this rate being equal to zero for
capital gains, other δhf being set to 1 and the other tax parameters being zero
too -, one has that, assuming no tax shield,
individual company
dividend yh1 =( 1− 0.5τh)(1− τi) yh1 =( 1− 0.05τh)(1− τi)
= .5457 = .7227
interest yh2 =1− τh = .49 yh2 =1− τh = .7325
cap. gain yh3 =1− τi = .7325 yh3 =1− τi = .7325
Let us examine the last column. Since both the paying company and the
parent one are German, the taxation of interest at parent level is equivalent,
in that respect, to non deductibility of interest payment at paying entity level
combined with full exemption at recipient level. Full exemption is now at work
for capital gains while it is imperfect for dividends ; should the exemption be
perfect, ﬁgures in the last column would be equal. Strict application of exemption
in the ﬁrst column should generate identical equal ﬁgures in both columns.
11For a partial application, see the Italian reform mentioned in note 6 above. An alternative
way to organise F-neutrality can be to give up taxing not only interest payments but also any
ordinary capital income, see the Allocation for Capital Equity, or ACE suggested by the
Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991), see Gammie (1992).
12For an exemption system which is neutral with respect to ﬁnancial choices
to be also LO-neutral, we need that the last equation also holds for f =4 .
Proposition 8 (LO-neutrality) The exemption system is neutral with respect
to the legal organisation of the business if (1) exemption at parent level is full,
(2) the tax system at subsidiary level doesn’t discriminate between distributed
and undistributed proﬁts and taxes branch proﬁts similarly, and (3) cash ﬂow
tax is at work.
Inspection of the last equation immediately shows that the exemption system
violates the horizontal and vertical equity principles according to which each
parent has to be taxed in line with its ability-to-pay. Indeed here each parent
is taxed separately on its location characterised incomes, whatever the total
amount can be. In terms of equity in the Haig-Simons view, moving from
imputation to exemption means a loss.
An immediate consequence is that we have,
Proposition 9 (KM-neutrality) The exemption system is neutral with re-
spect to the location of the parent if (1) exemption at parent level is full, (2)
the tax system at subsidiary level doesn’t discriminate between distributed and
undistributed proﬁts and taxes branch proﬁts similarly, and (3) cash ﬂow tax is
at work.
Under those conditions, if tax competition is at work, it is to attract branches
or subsidiaries, presumably active entities like plants. If government compete
to get jobs provided by MNE workers, the exemption system certainly boosts
tax competition.
Moreover this situation is likely to generate problems of transfer pricing and
strategic location of the production and the distribution.
Transfer pricing Manipulating the price p used for internal transactions
within the multijurisdictional ﬁrm can change the value of y, since,
∂y
∂p
=( τi − τj)(q − α) 6=0 (25)
Especially if the i entity needs to buy to the j entity, q − α > 0 and p will
be increased if τi > τj in order to minimise the tax base in the higher taxing
jurisdiction12.
12See the literature on transfer pricing, in particular the critical appraisal of transfer pricing
manipulation in conclusion of the empirical study of Bernard and Weiner (1990). They argue
that while in general multinational corporations can reduce their tax obligations by setting
transfers prices that diﬀer from at arm’s length prices, their ability to do so is constrained by
tax regulation in their home and host countries. Otherwise it may be easier to avoid taxes
through other channels - we immediately think of management fees and royalties for patents
or know how - while transfer price may serve a primarily managerial role within the ﬁrm,
as described by Eccles (1985) and Robbins and Stobaugh (1973). See also e.g Elytzir and
Mintz (1996) and Weichenrieder (1996) and on the speciﬁc issue of the primary and secondary
adjustements, Gérard and Godefroid (2001).
13Tax competition or strategic location of the plant or the distribu-
tion Indeed now,
y =( 1 − τi)[vq − p(q − α) − cα]+τiα




=( τj − τi)(p − c − 1) 6=0 (27)
If τi > τj, the sign of that expression depends on the one of p−c−1 and thus
on the ”generosity” of the depreciation allowances mechanism ; if it is generous,
as it is the case under cash ﬂow tax, it may be that the multijurisdictional ﬁrm




=( τj − τi)(v − p) 6=0 (28)
and it will locate distribution in jurisdiction j.
Do we now have a candidate for the perfectly integrated tax system,f r e eo f
tax competition ?
The derivatives just above imply answering negatively to that question. In-
deed stopping potential tax competition for getting branches or subsidiaries
further involves that (τi,a i) be independent of i and j, which needs a further
harmonisation of the tax rates and bases. Then,
Proposition 10 (Perfectly integrated tax system) The exemption system
is a perfectly integrated tax system if (1) exemption at parent level is full, (2)
the tax system at subsidiary level doesn’t discriminate between distributed and
undistributed proﬁts and taxes branches proﬁts similarly, (3) cash ﬂow tax is at
work, and (4) tax parameters in the branches or subsidiaries jurisdictions are
independent of the location of those entities.
As a conclusion of this discussion, exemption can be a good candidate to the
status of a perfectly integrated tax system if completed with cash ﬂow tax and
harmonised tax rates and bases14. However a problem with exemption arises if
the income comes from a low tax jurisdiction. It could be useful then to have it
deemed to be channelled through a ﬁctive jurisdiction with a minimum accepted
13This a (marginal) eﬀective tax rate argument ; since such a rate is equal to
τ(1−a)
1−aτ ,i t s
value decrases when a goes up.
14That system is close to the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) proposed by US
Treasury in 1992, see US Treasury Dept. (1977) and Tax Law Revue, 47 (3), 1992, especially
Sunley (1992). The entire issue of that latter publication was devoted to various analyses
of the US Treasury proposals ; indeed the US Treasury outlined various alternatives, but the
favoured one was CBIT.
14tax rate supposed to be the source one. Incidentally let us note that under this
system each administration has only to know the rules of its tax system.
Moreover notice that, since a =1 ,t h em a r g i n a le ﬀective tax rate then van-
ishes so that, using that criterion, the eﬃciency loss involved by the exemption
system is smaller.
4 Consolidated tax base
Imagine now that a consolidated tax base is computed in the jurisdiction of the
parent entity and then apportioned to jurisdictions i and j according to some
criteria, like sales, labour cost, the distribution of the property or still the value
added15. The consolidated tax base is then
t = v − c − ah (29)
further apportioned to the two jurisdictions according to some criteria. Con-
sider only one such criterion, the value added, which seems to be most in line
with EU way of thinking. Then, tax liabilities in the respective jurisdictions
are
τi
[vq − p(q − α) − cα]
v − c
(v − c − ah) (30)
and
τj
[v(1 − q)+p(q − α) − c(1− α)]
v − c
(v − c − ah) (31)
so that the net income of the ﬁrm becomes
y = v − c
−τi [vq − p(q − α) − cα]
v − c − ah
v − c
+τj [v (1 − q)+p(q − α) − c(1 − α)]
v − c − ah
v − c
(32)
Should we use sales on the retail market instead of value added, or the
distribution of labour cost or of property, that equation becomes
y = v − c − {τiq + τj (1 − q)}(v − c − ah) (33)
or
y = v − c − {τiα + τj (1 − α)}(v − c − ah) (34)
We can now examine that system according to the same criteria as in the
previous section.
15On consolidated tax base and apportionment, see Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) and
Weiner (2001).
15F-neutrality Since we are within a consolidated entity the problem of the
ﬁnancial neutrality within the ﬁrm is no longer relevant and the system is per se
F-neutral enforcing. However a problem arises when ﬁnancing outside the ﬁrm
is considered. It might be solved using the rules described for the exemption
mechanism. Then,
Proposition 11 (F-neutrality) The consolidated tax base with apportionment
system is neutral with respect to ﬁnancial choices if it incorporates a F-neutral
exemption system for outside ﬁnance.
LO-neutrality Per se, consolidation involves neutrality with respect to
legal organisation, assuming that the legal form of the entity is not a criterion
of apportionment. Then,
Proposition 12 (LO-neutrality) The consolidated tax base with apportion-
ment system is neutral with respect to the legal organisation of the business if
the legal organisation of the business is no part of the set of criteria of the
apportionment rule.
KM-neutrality Apportionment doesn’t imply capital import neutrality
a n dt h u sn e u t r a l i t yw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h el o c a t i o no ft h ep a r e n ts i n c ey is not
independent of h. However if the composition of the tax base becomes inde-
pendent of the jurisdiction where it is computed, then the consolidated tax base
with apportionment system can be KM-neutral. Within the EU, this is an
argument to set up common rules for computing the tax base.
Notice that if the system fulﬁlls the conditions of F-neutrality, it imbeds
cash ﬂow taxation and thus ah =1necessarily independent of h.
Then,
Proposition 13 (KM-neutrality) The consolidated tax base with apportion-
ment system is neutral with respect to the location of the parent if the compu-
tation of the tax base obeys rules which are independent of the location of the
parent.
KX-neutrality We ﬁrst note that consolidated tax base with apportion-
ment doesn’t rule out transfer pricing strategies nor tax competition16. Indeed
∂y
∂p
=( τi − τj)(q − α)
v − c − ah
v − c
6=0 (35)
16Though they use another type of model Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller and Schjelderup
(2001) obtain a similar result, concluding ”that the strategic and tax-saving incentives to
exploit transfer pricing may well be stronger under formula apportionment than under separate
accounting”.
16However, unlike Nielsen, Raimondos-Moeller and Schjelderup (2001), we observe
a smaller eﬀect that under separate accounting17,s i n c e
v − c − ah
v − c
< 1 ,a h > 0 (36)
The similar observation holds when we examine strategic location of either the
production or the distribution.
∂y
∂α
=( τj − τi)(p − c)






=( τj − τi)(1− p)
v − c − ah
v − c
(38)




=( τj − τi)(v − c − ah) (39)
if sales on the retail market is the criterion and
∂y
∂α
=( τj − τi)(v − c − ah) (40)
if labour cost or property is the criterion. Note however that moving the places
where the good is sold from - changing q - can be less harmful than moving the
place of production - changing α -, which inherently implies jobs.
It turns out that the only way to rule out tax shifting strategies and tax
competition incentives is to harmonise the tax rates too, so that,
Proposition 14 (KX-neutrality) The consolidated tax base with apportion-
ment system is neutral with respect to the location of the branches and sub-
sidiaries, and the strategic use of transfer pricing as well, if the tax rates are
independent of the location of the branches or subsidiaries.
It should be noted that substituting apportionment formula determined in a
an aggregate way doesn’t change the problem since the ﬁrm can always escape
paying tax in a high tax jurisdiction by simply closing down its entity in that
jurisdiction.
As a conclusion,
Proposition 15 (Perfectly integrated tax system) The consolidated tax base
with apportionment system is a perfectly integrated tax system if (1) it incorpo-
rates a F-neutral exemption system for outside ﬁnance, (2) the composition of
the tax base is independent of the jurisdiction where the consolidated tax base is
computed, and (3) the tax rates are independent of the jurisdictions where the
entities are located.
17Remember that ah ≤ 1, and assume that v − c − 1 > 0 which, due to the intertemporal
deﬁnition of v and c, means that the margin in the ﬁrm is larger than the return of an
investment outside the ﬁrm, a rather weak assumption since otherwise the investment is not
undertaken.
17Also observe that, as under the exemption system, the internal rates of return
with and without tax are equal so that the marginal eﬀective tax rate vanishes.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Some policy conclusions arise from the discussion conducted in the paper, as
well as avenues for further research.
First, due to the discrimination among resident and non resident sharehold-
ers implied by the non-repayability of excess tax credit, the imputation system
apparently deﬁnitively belongs to the past, at least within an area where such kind
of discrimination is against the basic principles of the Union18. Nevertheless it
could come back to the forefront if supplemented in such a way that tax bases
and rates were harmonised and the excess credit made repayable. This is not
impossible in an integrated area like the EU, possibly through the adjunction of
an interjurisdictional clearing mechanism. In the absence of such supplements
t h eG e r m a nm o v eo b e y st h ec h a n g ei nt h ev i s i o no fi n t e g r a t i o na n dt h en e e d
to eliminate discrimination among shareholders from diﬀerent jurisdictions of
residence.
Especially, as long as individual shareholders are concerned, the system can
be made consistent with the subsidiarity principle which commands that, if
possible, tax rates be determined by the member jurisdictions independently,
including the right to decide for a global system and the Haig-Simons view of
equity. In that case cross border exchange of information has to be set up in
the same line as it has been decided for interests at EU level19.
Unlike imputation, exemption can be made a perfectly integrated tax system
if combined with cash ﬂow tax and harmonised - or approximated - tax rates
and bases at aﬃliate jurisdiction level. If this is the case that system can avoid
strategic use of transfer pricing and delocation of production or sales for tax
purposes while keeping tax bases computed separately. Obviously harmonisa-
tion of tax rates goes beyond the objective of the EU Commission ; however
perfect integration implies that the rates be decided au Union level ; this is
inherent to a system based on the source principle.
Replacing the computation of separate tax bases by the one of a consolidated
tax base with an apportionment formula doesn’t per se eliminate incentives to
tax shifting and thus to transfer pricing strategies and location moving of sales
or production for tax purposes. The consolidated base with apportionment
18Within the European Union, imputation has been recently abolished not only in Germany
- since January 1, 2001 - but also in Ireland and, de facto, in the United Kingdom - both since
April 6, 1999 -. However it is still at work in Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
19On exchange of information see a.o. Bachetta and Espinoza (1995, 2000), Eggert and
Kolmar (2000, 2001) and Huizinga and Nielsen (2000).
18system can do that only if it is supplemented with an harmonisation of the bases
and rates across jurisdictions although perfect integration also calls for cash ﬂow
tax and other ﬁnancial neutrality requirements as under the imputation system.
Since perfect integration has the same requirements under both imputation
and consolidation with apportionment, what is to be gained from implementing
the latter rather than the former ? However, while implementing the latter
has certainly a compliance cost both for the multijurisdictional ﬁrm and the
administrations, it also exhibits an advantage, i.e. to oﬀset losses.
Finally, since in any case harmonisation of bases and rates is needed, why
not tax multijurisdictional ﬁrm at Union level and apportion the revenue ac-
cording to aggregate criteria, possibly turning corporate taxation to an inter-
jurisdictional redistributive instrument. This is at least an avenue to explore.
Another one should be to come back to the diﬀerent steps set forth above in




[1] Alworth, J., 1988, The ﬁnance, investment and taxation decisions of multi-
nationals, Blackwell, London.
[2] Alworth, J. and G. Arachi, 2001, ”The eﬀects of taxes on corporate ﬁnanc-
ing decisions : evidence from a panel of Italian ﬁrms”, International Tax
and Public Finance, 8, pp. 353-376.
[3] Auerbach, A., 1979, ”Wealth maximization and the cost of capital”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 93, pp. 433-446.
[4] Bachetta, P. and M. Espinosa, 1995, ” Information Sharing and Tax Com-
petition among Governments ”, Journal of International Economics,3 9 ,
pp. 102-121.
[5] Bachetta, P. and M. Espinosa, 2000, ” Exchange of Information Clauses in
Tax Treaties ”, International Tax and Public Finance, 7, pp. 275-293.
[6] Boadway, R. and N. Bruce, 1992, ”Problems with integrating corporate and
personal income taxes in an open economy”, Journal of Public Economics,
48, pp. 39-66.
19[7] Bordignon, M., S. Giannini and P. Panthegini, 2001, ”Reforming business
taxation : lessons from Italy ?”, International Tax and Public Finance,8 ,
pp. 191-208.
[8] Bradford, D., 1977, Blueprints for basic tax reforms,U ST r e a s u r y ,W a s h -
ington.
[9] Bernard, J.-T. and R.J. Weiner, 1990, Multinational Corporations, Transfer
Prices and Taxes : Evidence form the US Petroleum Industry, in A. Razin
and J. Slemrod, ed., Taxation in the Global Economy,T h eU n i v e r s i t yo f
Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
[10] Bradford, D., 1981, ”The incidence and allocation eﬀects of a tax on cor-
porate distributions”, Journal of Public Economics,1 5 ,p p .1 - 2 2 .
[11] European Commission, 2001, ”Toward an internal market without tax ob-
stacles, a strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate
tax base for their EU-wide activities”, COM (2001) 582 ﬁnal,E UC o m -
mission, Brussels, 47p.
[12] Devereux, M.P. and H. Freeman, 1995, ”The impact of tax on FDI: empiri-
cal evidence and the implication for tax integration schemes”, International
Tax and Public Finance, 2, pp. 85-106.
[13] Eccles, R., G., 1985, The transfer pricing problem, a theory for practice,
Heath, Lexington, Mass.
[14] Eggert, W. and M. Kolmar, 2000, ”Residence-based capital taxation: Why
information is voluntarily exchanged and why it is not”, CESifo Working
Paper 402.
[15] Eggert, W. and M. Kolmar, 2001, ”Information Sharing, Multiple Nash
Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital—Tax Competition”, a paper presented
at IIPF 2001,L i n z .
[16] Elitzyr, R. and J. Mintz, 1996, Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax
competition, Journal of Public Economics 60, 401-422.
[17] Feldstein, M. and Hartman, D., 1979, ”The optimal taxation of foreign
source investment income”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, pp. 613-
624.
[18] Fuest, C. and B. Huber, 2000, ”Can corporate-personal tax integration
survive in open economies ? Lessons from the German tax reform”, Fi-
nanzArchiv, 57, pp. 514-524.
[19] Fuest, C. and B. Huber, 2001, ”Is corporate-personal tax integration in
open economies counterproductive ?”, University of Munich, mimeo.
[20] Gammie, M., 1992, ”Corporate tax harmonization : an ”ACE” proposal”,
European Taxation, 31, pp. 238-242.
20[21] Gérard, M., 1982, Le ﬁnancement des investissements, leur volume et
l’impôt, Presses Universitaires de Namur, Namur.
[22] Gérard, M., 1993, ”Cost of capital, investment location and marginal ef-
fective tax rate : methodology and application”, chap. 4 in Heimler, A.
and Meulders, D., (eds), Empirical Approaches to Fiscal Policy Modelling,
Chapman and Hall, London, pp. 61-80.
[23] Gérard, M. and M.-F. Gillard, 2001, ”The least taxed path for repatriat-
ing corporate income within a multinational ﬁrm, a typology of tax relief
mechanisms”, revision and extension of a paper presented at IIPF 2000,
Sevilla, Arpege / Fucam, mimeo, 18p.
[24] Gérard, M. and Ph. Godfroid, 2001, ”Optimal transfer pricing under ac-
ceptance uncertainty and risk aversion”, Arpege, Fucam, mimeo,2 8 p .
[25] Goolsbee, A. and E. Maydew, 2000, ”Coveting thy neighbor’s manufac-
turing : the dilemma of state income apportionment”, Journal of Public
Economics, 75, pp. 125-143.
[26] Grubert, H., 1998, ”Taxes and the division of foreign operating income
among royalties, interest, dividends and retained earnings.”, Journal of
Public Economics, 68, 269-290.
[27] Haig, R.M., 1921, The Federal Income Tax, Columbia University Press,
New York.
[28] Homburg, S., 2000, ”German tax reform 2000: description and appraisal”,
FinanzArchiv, 57, pp. 504-513.
[29] Huizinga, H. and S.B. Nielsen, 2000, ”Withholding Taxes or Information
Exchanges : the Taxation of International Interest Flows”,ap a p e rp r e -
sented at IIPF 2000, Sevilla.
[30] Institute for Fiscal Studies, Capital Taxes Group, 1991, Equity for Compa-
nies : a corporation tax for the 1990s, Commentary 26, IFS, London.
[31] Keen, M., 2000, ”Tax Reform in Germany”, International Monetary Fund,
mimeo, 27p.
[32] King, M.A., 1974, “Taxation and the cost of capital”, Review of Economic
Studies,41, pp. 21-35.
[33] King, M.A., 1977, Public Policy and the Corporation, Chapman and Hall,
London.
[34] King, M. and D. Fullerton, 1984, The Taxation of Income from Capital :
a Comparative Study of United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and
West- Germany, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
21[35] Mintz, J. and H. Tulkens, 1996, ”Optimality Properties of Alternative Sys-
tems of Taxation of Foreign Capital Income”, Journal of Public Economics,
60, pp. 373-399.
[36] Myles, G., 1995, Public Economics, Cambridge University press, Cam-
bridge, 546p.
[37] Nielsen, S.B., P. Raimondos-Moeller and G. Schjelderup, 2001, Formula
apportionment and transfer pricing under oligopolistic competition, CESifo
Working Paper 491, 20p.
[38] OECD, 1998, Model tax convention on income and capital, June 1998 con-
densed version, OECD, Paris, 304p.
[39] Ramsey, E.P., 1927, ”A contribution to the theory of taxation”, Economic
Journal, 37, pp. 47-61.
[40] Robbins, S. and R. Stobaugh, 1973, Money in the multinational enterprise,
Basic, New York.
[41] Schreiber, U., 2000, ”German tax reform - an international perspective”,
FinanzArchiv, 57, pp. 525-541.
[42] Simons, H.C., 1938, Personal Income Taxation, Univ. of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
[43] Stiglitz, J. , 1973, ”Taxation, corporate ﬁnancial policy, and the cost of
capital”, Journal of Public Economics, 2, pp. 1-34.
[44] Sunley, E., 1992, ”Corporate integration : an economic perspective”, Tax
Law Review, 47, pp. 621-643.
[45] US Treasury Dept., 1992, Report of the Department of Treasury on integra-
tion of the individual and corporate tax systems : taxing business income
once,U ST r e a s u r yD e p a r t m e n t ,J a n u a r y .
[46] Weichenrieder, A., 1996, Transfer pricing, double taxation and the cost of
capital, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98 (3), pp. 445-452.
[47] Weiner, J., 2001, ”The European Union and formula apportionment :
caveat emptor”, European Taxation, 41, pp. 380-388.
22